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## GUILT, ANGER AND COMPASSIONATE HELPING

*Nicholas Faulkner*

Compassion has oftentimes been viewed solely as an emotion, with no explicit need for ‘compassionate’ individuals to help those who are suffering (Cassell 2002). In contrast, recent scholarly work has reframed the definition of compassion, arguing that it must include some form of action (Whitebrook 2002 and Chapter 1 of this volume; Ben-Ze’Ev 2000). Following from these scholars, it seems that compassion arguably involves having both a sense of being moved by the suffering of another, and a desire to act to alleviate that person’s suffering, presumably by helping in some way. Thus, if compassion is to be extended across national, ethnic, religious and cultural boundaries, members of any one group (national, ethnic, religious or otherwise) must be willing to act to help members of other groups. In short, they must engage in intergroup, compassionate helping. In this chapter, the roles of two emotions – guilt and anger – in motivating such intergroup compassionate helping are examined.

Social psychologists have had a long-running interest in examining the causes of helping behaviour, and have, in more recent years, directly investigated the causes of *intergroup* helping behaviour (Dovidio *et al.* 2006). As a result, a great deal of social psychological research is useful, at least in an instructive capacity, in theorising about how to expand compassionate helping. Despite its great promise, however, recent findings in social psychology on the effects of guilt and anger on intergroup helping have not been integrated into work on compassion. This chapter addresses this lacuna in existing literature by using research from social psychology to hypothesise about the effects of two emotions – guilt and anger – on compassionate intergroup helping. It argues that anger may be more effective than guilt in fostering such helping. While guilt tends to increase individuals’ support for the abstract goal of compensation, it appears not to typically result in support for concrete action to help suffering outgroups. Anger, however, *does* tend to motivate concrete action.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the centrality of helping to the concept of compassion is highlighted. In this section, compassionate helping is defined as action that is taken to help a person or group that is suffering in some way. Second, the effect of guilt on compassionate helping is evaluated. In this section, the aetiology and definition of guilt is discussed, before reviewing evidence that suggests guilt increases commitment to the abstract goal of compensation, but does not uniformly lead to concrete action to help the suffering. Third, the effect of anger on compassionate helping is evaluated. As with guilt, the aetiology and definition of anger is first given, and is then followed by evidence demonstrating anger's ability to motivate concrete action. Finally, two reasons are given to explain why anger may be more effective than guilt in motivating compassionate helping.

### The centrality of helping to compassion

According to Nussbaum (2001: 301), compassion is 'a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person's undeserved misfortune'. For Nussbaum, however, while compassion is primarily an emotion, it also has a certain set of cognitive requirements associated with it:

Compassion ... has three cognitive elements: the judgement of *size* (a serious bad event has befallen someone); the judgement of *nondesert* (this person did not bring the suffering on himself or herself); and the *eudaimonistic judgement* (this person, or creature, is a significant element in my scheme of goals and projects, an end whose good is to be promoted).

(Nussbaum 2001: 306)

Nussbaum is not alone in characterising compassion as an emotion accompanied by certain cognitive beliefs or appraisals. Cassell (2002: 440), for instance, has similarly argued that compassion is 'more complex' than other emotions, and requires: (a) knowledge that another is suffering; (b) 'identification with the sufferer'; and, (c) 'knowledge of what the sufferer is experiencing'.

Some theorists, however, have argued that compassion is more than merely an emotion accompanied by certain cognitive requirements. Instead, according to these scholars, compassion involves *acting* to help those who are suffering (Whitebrook 2002 and Chapter 1 of this volume; Ben-Ze'Ev 2000). Typically, those who argue that compassion involves acting to help some suffering other make a distinction between 'pity' and 'compassion'. Unlike Nussbaum (1996: 29) – who suggests that the words 'pity' and 'compassion' describe the same emotion – Whitebrook and Ben-Ze'Ev make a clear distinction between the two concepts. 'Pity', they claim, refers to an *emotion* experienced upon recognising the suffering of some other person or group. Contrarily, 'compassion' refers to *action* that aims to help those who are suffering, and that may follow from feeling pity.

While Ben-Ze'Ev and Whitebrook agree that 'pity' refers to emotion and 'compassion' to helping action, they do not explicitly agree on the extent to which helping action must be based on pity in order for it to be characterised as 'compassion'. Ben-Ze'Ev (2000: 328) rather ambiguously claims that compassion involves 'a willingness to become personally involved' and, compared to pity, 'involves far greater commitment to substantial help'. He does not, however, assert that help must be based on feelings of pity in order for it to be characterised as 'compassion'. Conversely, Whitebrook (2002: 530) argues that compassion 'should denote acting on the basis of feelings of pity, rather than simply feeling an emotion'. In short, Whitebrook claims that in order for helping action to be characterised as compassion, the help must 'follow from', or be based on, feelings of pity. In Chapter 1 of this volume, she emphasises the distinction between compassion viewed as emotion and compassion viewed as action. In doing so, Whitebrook implicitly suggests that helping action does not necessarily need to be based on pity in order to be characterised as compassion.

Following Whitebrook, I make a distinction between compassion as emotion, and compassion as action. I assume that action to help those who are suffering does not need to be based on feelings of pity in order to be characterised as 'compassionate helping'. Broadly following Ben-Ze'Ev (2000) as well, I characterise 'compassionate helping' as action that is taken to help a person or group that is suffering in some way. This action may or may not be based on feelings of pity. In what follows, I use empirical social psychological research to hypothesise about the effects of guilt and anger on compassionate helping.

## Guilt

Similar to the term 'compassion', 'guilt' is also used in multiple and occasionally conflicting ways (Baumeister *et al.* 1994). One way to describe the distinct characteristics of guilt is to compare it to shame. In quotidian parlance, the terms 'guilt' and 'shame' are often used interchangeably. Guilt and shame, however, refer to 'distinct and distinguishable experiences' (Baumeister *et al.* 1994). Both guilt and shame are negatively valenced (thus painful) emotions, and both are evoked when one commits some form of transgression or wrongdoing (Tangney *et al.* 2007a, 2007b; Schmader & Lickel 2006). Guilt differs from shame, however, in the extent to which the global self is 'blamed' for the wrongdoing:

Currently, the most dominant basis for distinguishing between shame and guilt centres on the object of negative evaluation and disapproval. Shame involves a negative evaluation of the global self; guilt involves a negative evaluation of a specific behaviour ... This differential emphasis on self ('I did that horrible thing') versus behaviour ('I *did* that horrible *thing*') gives rise to distinct emotional experiences associated with distinct patterns of motivation and subsequent behaviour.

(Tangney *et al.* 2007b: 25–6)

Thus, according to Tangney *et al.* (2007b; 2007a), guilt is a painful emotion that arises when one negatively evaluates their *behaviour* (as opposed to themselves) after having committed a transgression. This definition describes *interpersonal guilt*: that is, guilt that arises when an *individual* commits some form of wrongdoing. There is, however, another form of guilt that seems relevant to the task of increasing inter-group compassionate helping: group-based guilt.

Group-based guilt (sometimes called collective guilt) arises when individuals feel personally or collectively complicit in the blameworthy actions of the groups to which they belong (Lickel *et al.* 2011; Iyer *et al.* 2004; Branscombe & Doosje 2004).<sup>1</sup> For example, white Australians may experience group-based guilt associated with the historical mistreatment of, and the current inequality facing, indigenous Australians (Leach *et al.* 2006, 2007). Similarly, Dutch citizens may experience group-based guilt associated with their nation's historical mistreatment of African slaves, or with the extent to which Jews were deported from Holland to Germany during the Second World War (Zeibel *et al.* 2009). Since group-based guilt occurs between groups, it is worth examining further to determine to what extent it motivates compassionate helping across those groups. If group-based guilt does increase the extent to which one group helps another, then it may provide an effective basis for expanding compassionate helping internationally.

### ***Theoretically, guilt should motivate helping***

Theoretically, guilt is an emotion that should increase the inclination to make reparations for harm that you (or your group) have inflicted on another person or group (Doosje *et al.* 1998: 873). At the interpersonal level, guilt is associated with the inclination to make reparations for the harm that an individual has inflicted on another person (e.g. Barrett 1995; Frijda *et al.* 1989; Frijda 1986; Lewis 1993). At the intergroup level, some research is supportive of the contention that group-based guilt encourages some forms of intergroup helping. Importantly, however, not all research supports this contention: some, in fact, highlights the limitations of guilt as a motivator of intergroup helping. To frame this in terms of compassion, some (but certainly not all) social psychological research suggests that guilt may motivate some form of intergroup compassionate helping.

### ***Guilt predicts support for apology, forgiveness and abstract compensation***

Specifically, social psychologists have found that group-based guilt tends to motivate support for apologising to those who are suffering as a result of the actions of one's ingroup. In two studies, McGarty *et al.* (2005) tested this idea by examining white Australians' attitudes towards issuing an apology to indigenous Australians. White Australians may feel group-based guilt associated with their past poor treatment of indigenous Australians, and the persisting systemic inequality between the

two groups. In both studies, McGarty *et al.* (2005) found that group-based guilt was a significant predictor of support for apology: white Australians who felt guilty for their group's role in causing harm to indigenous Australians were far more likely to support apologising to indigenous Australians. Moreover, the effect of guilt on support for apologising held even after statistically controlling for relevant socio-demographic variables, and perceptions of ingroup advantage. A similar association between guilt and apology at the interpersonal level has also been found previously (Roseman *et al.* 1994).

Group-based guilt is also linked to intergroup forgiveness. Hewstone *et al.* (2004) found that amongst a sample of students in Northern Ireland, group-based guilt predicted intergroup forgiveness. Protestants who felt guilty for the harm their group had done to Catholics were more likely to forgive Catholics. A virtually identical pattern of results was found amongst Catholics.

In addition to its likely effects on apology and forgiveness, group-based guilt also increases commitment to the abstract goal of compensation. For example, guilt about Holland's past colonisation of Indonesia predicted Dutch subjects' support for general government compensation to Indonesia (Doosje *et al.* 1998). Similarly, European Americans' group-based guilt associated with the advantages they enjoy relative to African Americans predicted support for the abstract goal of compensation (Iyer *et al.* 2003). In another series of studies, Gunn & Wilson (2011) investigated the extent to which collective guilt was positively associated with willingness to compensate. Specifically, they investigated whether non-Aboriginal Canadians who felt guilty for their group's historical mistreatment of Canadian Aboriginals were more likely to support offering Canadian Aboriginals compensation. Their measure of compensation, however, conflated measures of a general commitment to compensation (e.g. 'Should Aboriginals be compensated by Canada for the harms they endured in residential schools?') with specific concrete actions aimed at compensation (e.g. 'Which activities are you personally willing to partake in to ensure that the harms committed against Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed? Check beside all that apply: discuss with others, sign a petition, write a letter, take part in a protest/march, volunteer for groups aimed at improving conditions for Aboriginals, donate money') (Gunn & Wilson 2011: 1,479), thus making it impossible to determine whether guilt was associated with both abstract compensation *and* concrete action in their studies.<sup>2</sup>

### ***Guilt does not typically predict concrete helping action***

Earlier studies showing the positive effects of group-based guilt on apology, forgiveness and compensation understandably led researchers to have a generally positive view of guilt's ability to foster intergroup helping. More recently, however, an increasingly sceptical view of guilt's ability to motivate helping action has emerged (Lickel *et al.* 2011; Iyer & Leach 2010). According to this sceptical view, while guilt is associated with motivations to make reparations for wrongdoing, its narrow

self-focus and low arousal make it rather limited in motivating genuine efforts to help outgroups (Leach *et al.* 2002, 2006; Thomas *et al.* 2009; Iyer & Leach 2010). Specifically, particularly when controlling for other emotions and relevant constructs, guilt has little to no association with the extent to which individuals engage in concrete helping action (e.g. Harth *et al.* 2008).

A number of studies have illustrated this claim. In one study, Iyer *et al.* (2003: Study 3) investigated European Americans' feelings and attitudes associated with their group's discrimination against African Americans. Results showed that group-based guilt about the discrimination predicted support for compensatory policies, but *did not* predict support for policies designed to increase opportunities for African Americans. Instead, they found, sympathy was a better predictor of these policies. In another study, Iyer *et al.* (2007: Study 1) found that guilt about the USA's occupation of Iraq did not predict any political action intentions amongst their American sample. They also found the same pattern of results amongst British citizens: guilt did not predict political action (Iyer *et al.* 2007: Study 2). Finally, Leach *et al.* (2006) found that non-Aboriginal Australians' guilt about systemic disadvantage facing Aboriginal Australians predicted support for the abstract goal of compensation, but did not predict support for concrete political action.

### ***Guilt: an unreliable motivator of intergroup compassionate helping***

Taken together, these findings suggest that guilt is unlikely to be an effective motivator of compassionate helping. If compassionate helping is to be expanded internationally, then individuals must engage in concrete acts to help suffering others, irrespective of national, religious, ethnic or any other group differences. While guilt seems to encourage individuals to support the abstract goal of compensating those who have been harmed, it does not seem typically to motivate concrete helping action. Furthermore, not only is guilt (when it is felt) only limitedly effective in motivating compassionate helping, it is also frequently not likely to be felt to begin with. If group-based guilt is to be experienced, the ingroup needs to be viewed as responsible for harming some other group (Branscombe & Doosje 2004; Branscombe *et al.* 2004; Mallett & Swim 2007). In many cases of suffering, those who are needed to engage in compassionate helping may not have harmed the suffering. Instead, the suffering may have been caused by natural causes (e.g. tsunamis, earthquakes etc.), or by some third party. In such cases, group-based guilt seems unlikely to arise in the first place.

### **Anger**

In contrast to guilt, anger may be a more reliable motivator of intergroup compassionate helping. Anger is a high-arousal emotion (Rydell *et al.* 2008: Study 1; Lazarus 1991) that can occur when the cause of a negative outcome or state is attributed to factors that are under the control of some other individual or

group (Weiner *et al.* 1982; Lazarus 1991). As such, anger can be directed towards particular individuals, or towards particular groups. There are, however, a range of types of anger that may occur when a negative outcome or state is, put simply, 'blamed' on some group or individual. Batson *et al.* (2007) make a distinction between three different forms of anger – personal anger, empathic anger and moral outrage – that may occur in such cases. Personal anger occurs when one's own interests have been harmed. Empathic anger occurs when a cared-for other person's interests have been harmed. Finally, moral outrage is a form of anger that occurs when one perceives that a moral standard has been violated. Batson *et al.* (2007) argue that distinguishing between these forms of anger may facilitate a better understanding of moral emotion and behaviour.

Leach *et al.* (2006) detail another form of anger: that which is directed towards one's own ingroup. This form of anger occurs when an individual becomes angry at their own ingroup for some harm that their ingroup has perpetrated against some other group. For example, European Australians may experience ingroup-directed anger in relation to their group's poor treatment of indigenous Australians.

### ***Anger often leads to action against the focus of one's anger***

While there are some differences in the action tendencies associated with each type of anger (see Batson *et al.* 2007), at least one tendency broadly exists across all four of the forms of anger just highlighted. Namely, when people become angry, they typically act to confront whomever their anger is directed towards. Many studies support this claim. One study of British soccer fan's reactions to the result of a match found that anger about the result predicted a desire to 'confront' and 'argue with' supporters of the opposing team (Crisp *et al.* 2007). In another study, East Germans who felt angry about their relatively disadvantaged position compared to West Germans were most keen to publicly protest (Kessler & Mummendey 2001). Similarly, (Mackie *et al.* 2000) found that anger directed towards an outgroup predicted the desire to take action against that outgroup. In another series of studies, anger felt by individual members of a harmed group predicted their desire to confront an outgroup that had harmed their group (Gordijn *et al.* 2006; Yzerbyt *et al.* 2003). In yet another study, anger predicted students' decisions to confront an authority in protest against fee increases (Stürmer & Simon 2009: Study 1).

Each of the studies just mentioned broadly examined the effect of *personal anger* on action against the person or group on which the anger was focussed. However, the desire to confront those whom anger is directed towards is not limited solely to personal anger. Indeed, the desire to confront harm-doers even occurs when individuals are angry at harm done to *outgroups*, rather than merely to themselves or their own groups. Van Zomeren *et al.* (2004) found that anger about an outgroup's unfair treatment by an authority predicted intentions to engage in actions to confront that authority.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, Van Zomeren *et al.* (2004) found that anger was as strong a predictor of intentions to confront the authority in cases where an

outgroup was harmed, as it was in cases where an ingroup was harmed. Similarly, in another series of studies, European Americans' anger at their own ingroup for its discrimination against African Americans was found to predict both abstract intentions to confront those responsible, and willingness to join a political group to confront those responsible (Iyer & Leach n.d.; Leach & Iyer n.d.). Similarly still, another study found that British citizens' anger at the US government's decision to invade Iraq predicted willingness to engage in political action to confront the government (Iyer *et al.* 2007: Study 2).

Taken together, these studies demonstrate that anger can motivate action against entities who have caused harm to one's self or ingroup or to some other individual or outgroup. This desire to confront those who are perceived to have caused harm may lead to some forms of compassionate helping. In particular, this would lead to compassionate helping in situations where anger is directed towards some group or individual who is causing some other group to suffer. For example, if anger is directed towards a dictator who is causing people in his or her country to suffer, then such anger may lead to actions to confront that dictator, thus potentially reducing the suffering he or she causes to his or her subjects.

### ***Anger increases intergroup, ostensibly compassionate helping***

While anger does cause individuals to confront the entity who is the focus of their anger, the effect of anger on compassionate helping does not seem confined merely to confronting some harm-doer. Instead, anger can motivate forms of concrete action that are intended to *directly* benefit those who are suffering (as opposed to confronting a harm-doer, which may only indirectly benefit the suffering). Montada & Schneider (1989), for instance, found that German citizens' moral outrage about inequality in their country predicted readiness to engage in a range of activities – including 'spending money' and 'joining an activity group' – to help the disadvantaged. In fact, of the emotions measured in Montada & Schneider (1989), moral outrage was the best predictor of helping. Moreover, the effect of moral outrage on helping tendencies remained significant even when controlling for a host of other emotions, including guilt, sympathy and fear.

Ingroup-directed anger also seems capable of motivating direct forms of intergroup compassionate helping. In two studies, Aarti Iyer and Colin Leach (Iyer & Leach n.d.; Leach & Iyer n.d.; also see Iyer & Leach 2010) measured the predictive effect of ingroup-directed anger on helping intentions. Their results revealed that ingroup-directed anger predicted intentions to compensate and make retribution. Specifically, European Americans' anger directed at their own ingroup for racial discrimination against African Americans predicted support for the abstract goal of compensation. The effect of anger on compassionate helping, however, does not appear to be confined merely to support for the abstract goal of compensation. Rather, anger also appears to motivate concrete action to help the suffering. Leach *et al.* (2006), for instance, found that non-Aboriginal Australians' anger about



the systemic disadvantage faced by Aboriginal Australians predicted willingness for concrete political action (e.g. ‘donate money to the cause’ and ‘help organize a demonstration’). Furthermore, a final study found that British citizens’ anger about the decision to go to war in Iraq predicted political action (e.g. ‘sign a petition’, ‘volunteer’, ‘attend a rally’) aimed at: (a) compensating Iraq; (b) advocating withdrawal from Iraq; and, (c) confronting those responsible for going to Iraq (Iyer *et al.* 2007). In the same study, guilt was found not to predict any action tendencies.

In sum, anger seems capable of motivating two forms of compassionate helping. First, it motivates individuals to confront those who are causing harm. Second, at least in the case of ingroup-directed anger, it motivates concrete action to directly help those who are suffering.

### Why anger may be more effective than guilt

The previous two sections of this chapter have highlighted evidence that suggests that guilt is largely ineffective in promoting concrete, direct action to help those who are suffering. In contrast, anger *does* seem capable of motivating concrete, direct forms of compassionate helping. But why might anger be more effective than guilt in motivating such action? While empirical research on this question is somewhat lacking, there are at least two possible explanations. The first explanation relates to the differential extent that guilt and anger are associated with physiological arousal. Guilt is typically characterised as a low-arousal emotion, whereas anger is characterised as a high-arousal emotion (Lazarus 1991). Indeed, a range of studies has demonstrated that anger increases blood pressure (Gambaro & Rabin 1969; Ax 1953; Schachter 1957), and that anger is typically felt as a higher-arousal emotion than guilt (Reisenzein 1994; also see Rydell *et al.* 2008). While empirical research is yet to validate the following claim directly, it appears that the high arousal associated with anger makes it capable of motivating ‘the constructive, self-corrective action that the guilty want as a goal’, but are not willing to act upon (Leach *et al.* 2006: 1,243).

A second possible explanation of why anger is more effective than guilt in motivating compassionate helping relates to the self–other focus of each emotion. Self–other focus determines which ‘side’ in a helping situation – either an individual’s self/own group, or some suffering person/group – is most salient in an individual’s mind when considering helping. To illustrate this, consider the example where a person in a relatively advantaged position is considering helping someone who is in a relatively disadvantaged position. This example is useful, as many cases of compassionate helping require advantaged groups (e.g. ‘the rich’) to help disadvantaged groups (e.g. ‘the poor’). In such cases:

When self-focused, the advantaged can be moved to pride or guilt in response to their privilege, depending on its perceived legitimacy. In contrast, focus-

ing on others can promote sympathy, moral outrage, or disdain toward the disadvantaged.

(Leach *et al.* 2002: 140)

Guilt is typically characterised as a self-focussed emotion (Hoffman 1976; Iyer *et al.* 2004; Leach *et al.* 2002; Thomas *et al.* 2009). As a result, individuals who feel guilt may be 'too wrapped up in their own misery to help the disadvantaged' (Leach *et al.* 2002: 145; Hoffman 1976). In other words, the self-focus of guilt can impede helping action, limiting it merely to 'tokenistic, top-down forms of symbolic action' designed primarily to assuage the helper's negative feelings (Thomas *et al.* 2009: 325; Iyer *et al.* 2004; McGarty *et al.* 2005).

In contrast, at least some forms of anger are not self-focussed. Moral outrage, in particular, as noted above, is an other-focussed response. Since it is other-focussed, it can promote action to help the suffering, rather than simply to assuage individuals' own negative emotional states (e.g. Montada & Schneider 1989). Not all forms of anger, however, are so clearly other-focussed. Personal anger, for instance, may be self-focussed. One study hinting at personal anger's possible self-focus demonstrated that individuals who felt personal anger were willing to protest only when the protest provided an opportunity for catharsis of aggressive tension (Stürmer & Simon 2009). Moreover, the same study found that when participants were provided with a series of jokes designed to reduce anger, the relationship between anger and willingness to protest disappeared (Stürmer & Simon 2009: Study 2). In other words, people experiencing personal anger were willing to protest, but if they were given some well-designed jokes before being given the opportunity to protest, they no longer were willing to protest. While this suggests that anger is not uniformly other-focussed, it remains likely to be, on the whole, more other-focussed than guilt. As a result, anger seems more likely than guilt to motivate concrete forms of compassionate helping.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that anger appears more effective than guilt in motivating intergroup compassionate helping. In contrast to some authors who have written about compassionate action (e.g. Whitebrook 2002 and Chapter 1 of this volume), the arguments presented here have been based not solely on reason and appeals to like-minded theorists, but on empirical evidence from social psychology. This is important, at least for triangulation purposes, as doing this goes some way towards assessing the real-world effects of specific emotions on compassionate action in existing societies, something which may differ from the important, reason-based arguments about the effects of specific emotion presented by political and social theorists.

This chapter started by drawing on Whitebrook (2002 and Chapter 1 of this volume) and Ben-Ze'Ev (2000) to argue that helping is central to the concept of 'compassion'. It then examined the effects of guilt and anger on compassionate helping. Both experimental and observational research suggest that guilt increases

abstract support for compensating those who have been harmed. This abstract support for compensation, however, does not necessarily translate to concrete helping action. Indeed, as the chapter has highlighted, many studies show that while guilt predicts abstract support for compensation, it often does not predict support for concrete action to help the suffering.

In contrast, anger has been shown to predict concrete action to directly help the suffering. Furthermore, it also predicts decisions to confront harm-doers, thus potentially indirectly helping those who are suffering at the hands of some harm-doer (e.g. a dictator, government authority or competing group). Thus, it appears anger is a more effective motivator of compassionate helping than guilt. There are a minimum of two reasons that at least somewhat explain why anger may be more effective than guilt in motivating compassionate helping. First, anger involves higher levels of physiological arousal than guilt. Second, anger appears to be, on the whole, more other-focussed than guilt, since guilt is very much a self-focussed emotion.

One limitation of this chapter is that it has not discussed the frequency and extent to which anger and guilt are experienced in response to the suffering of another person or group. Of course, if anger or guilt are to increase compassionate helping, then anger or guilt must first be felt. Future research could investigate the extent to which guilt and anger are experienced in response to another's suffering. What this chapter has demonstrated, however, is that interventions designed to increase concrete forms of compassionate helping would benefit by attempting to make potential helpers *angry* about another's suffering. Conversely, the utility of guilt in such interventions seems limited.

## Notes

- 1 Earlier research overwhelmingly studied guilt at only the interpersonal level; that is, it studied guilt that arose from 'one's own *individual* behavior and wrongdoing' (Lickel *et al* 2011: 154, emphasis added). Recently, however, there has been an increased recognition that people 'can experience emotions on the basis of their self-categorization as group members' (Iyer and Leach 2010: 345; Iyer & Leach n.d.; Smith 1993). As such, the group-based guilt that individuals can feel in relation to their group's current or past transgressions, or in relation to their group's complicity in wide-scale injustice (Mallett & Swim 2007), has received increased attention amongst social psychologists.
- 2 However, given that the specific actions were strongly positively correlated with broad support for group compensation (Gunn & Wilson 2011: 1,479), one would expect (but cannot confirm) that guilt was positively correlated with both abstract support for compensation *and* support for taking concrete action.
- 3 It is worth noting, however, that more anger was experienced when an ingroup, rather than an outgroup, was the subject of the unfair treatment.

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